Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

We develop solution concepts for games with incomplete information which are robust to the private and strategic information held by the agents in the game. We present epistemic foundations for these solution concepts and establish relationship between them. In particular, we characterize the solution concepts for supermodular games and potential games with private information, a version of the beauty contest and oligopoly competition among them. We analyze the sensitivity of the equilibrium set to the private information and relate it to the (partial) identification problem.

Joint work with Stephen Morris, Princeton University.

发言人详细信息

Dirk Bergemann, is Douglass and Marian Campbell Professor of Economics at Yale University. Dirk received his B.A. in economics at J.W. Goethe University in Frankfurt and his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Pennsylvania in. He joined Yale in 1995 as an assistant professor, having previously served as a faculty member at Princeton University. He has been affiliated with the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale since 1996. His research is concerned with game theory, contract theory and mechanism design. His research has been supported by grants from the National Science Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship and the German National Science Foundation. Bergemann is foreign editor for the Review of Economic Studies, and associate editor of several publications, including American Economic Journal, Econometrica, Games and Economic Behavior and the Journal of Economic Theory. For more information see http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/faculty/bergemann.htm.

日期：
演讲者：
Dirk Bergemann
所属机构：
Yale