Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms

Mechanism design (MD) provides a useful method to implement outcomes with desirable properties in systems with self-interested computational agents. One drawback, however, is that computation is implicitly centralized in MD theory, with a central planner taking all decisions. We consider distributed implementations, in which the outcome is determined by the self-interested agents themselves. Clearly this introduces new opportunities for manipulation. We propose a number of principles to guide the distribution of computation, focusing in particular on Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms for implementing outcomes that maximize total value across agents. Our solutions bring the complete implementation into an ex post Nash equilibrium.

Joint work with Jeffrey Shneidman.

Speaker Bios

David Parkes is a Gordon McKay Assistant Professor of Computer Science at Harvard University. He received his Ph.D. degree in Computer and Information Science from the University of Pennsylvania in 2001, and an M.Eng. (First class) in Engineering and Computing Science from Oxford University in 1995. He has published technical papers on electronic commerce, auction design, computational mechanism design, multi-agent systems, and bounded-rationality. Dr. Parkes was awarded the prestigious NSF CAREER Award in 2002, and the IBM Faculty Partnership Award in 2002 and 2003. He serves on the editorial board of the Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, and on the Program Committee of a number of leading conferences in artificial intelligence, multiagent systems, and electronic commerce.

Date:
Haut-parleurs:
David C. Parkes
Affiliation:
Harvard University