Long-run learning in games of cooperation

Cooperation in repeated games has been widely studied in experimental settings; however, the duration over which players participate in such experiments is typically confined to at most hours, and often to a single game. Given that in real world settings people may have years of experience, it is natural to ask how behavior in cooperative games evolves over the long run. Here we analyze behavioral data from three distinct games involving 571 individual experiments conducted over a two-year interval. First, in the case of a standard linear public goods game we show that as players gain experience, they become less generous both on average and in particular towards the end of each game. Second, we analyze a multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma where players are also allowed to make and break ties with their neighbors, finding that experienced players show an increase in cooperativeness early on in the game, but exhibit sharper “endgame” effects. Third, and finally, we analyze a collaborative search game in which players can choose to act selfishly or cooperatively, finding again that experienced players exhibit more cooperative behavior as well as sharper endgame effects. Together these results show consistent evidence of long-run learning, but also highlight directions for future theoretical work that may account for the observed direction and magnitude of the effects.